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Proposition 3 If ´eL eG > 0, and ° > ½, then ´eL eG < 1 if ® < 1; ´eL eG > 1 if
® > 1. If ´eL eG > 0, and ° < ½, then ´eL eG < 1 if ® > 1; ´eL eG > 1 if ® < 1.
Proof. Assume ´eL eG > 0: The condition ´eL eG > 1 implies¯¯
´r eG¯¯ > ¯¯1¡ ®+ ®´r eG¯¯ : (20)
Consider …rst the case in which both ´r eG and 1¡ ®+ ®´r eG are positive, which
occurs when ° > ½: Notice that in this case ´r eG = 1²
(° ¡ ½) eGeL®
(° ¡ ½) eGeL® + (½¡ 1)
> 0
implies ´r eG < 1. Therefore, condition (20), which collapses to (1¡ ®) ´r eG >
(1¡ ®), is veri…ed only for ® > 1.
Consider now the case in which both ´r eG and 1 ¡ ® + ®´r eG are negative,
which occurs when ° < ½: Condition (20) collapses to (1¡ ®) ´r eG < (1¡ ®),
which for ´r eG negative is veri…ed only for ® < 1:
The above proposition establishes that whenever a positive multiplier results
from the ’slope reversal’ of the PS schedule described above, the multiplier turns
out to be greater than one. When a positive multiplier is obtained under the
usual conditions (public demand more elastic and decreasing returns, or public
demand less elastic under increasing returns), its value is lower than one.
The interesting implication of proposition 3 is that if the ’slope reversal’
mechanism operates, the increase in employment and output is more than pro-
portional to the increase in public expenditure. In this peculiar case, in the new
equilibrium position the share of public demand on aggregate demand decreases
- and though public demand is more (less) elastic than private demand, the
new equilibrium mark-up increases (decreases). For example, in the presence
of an increasing returns technology, the existence of a public component of de-
mand more elastic than the private component (a) may bend downwards the PS
schedule; (b) ensures that a …scal expansion shift this downward sloping sched-
ule outwards and generate a more than proportional increase in output: at the
initial equilibrium the demand elasticity increases, stimulating the expansion,
while at the …nal equilibrium the elasticity of demand actually decreases This
qualitative di¤erence between the direction of the change of the mark-up at the
initial and …nal equilibrium positions is speci…c to the ’reversal of the slope’ sit-
uations and does not show up in the other situations, in which the employment
and output multiplier is positive.
4 Extensions
In the above discussion some simplifying hypotheses have been introduced,
among which the most relevant are the absence of income e¤ects of taxation
on labour supply and the reversed-L shape of the labour supply schedule. As to
the former, we believe that it is a convenient one, when the focus is on a trans-
mission mechanism of …scal policy based on product market competitiveness. It
is conceptually easy to embody both the labour supply and the elasticity e¤ects
in more complicated models. As to the latter, it allowed us to concentrate the
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analysis on labour demand and to escape the problems of stability and multi-
plicity of underemployment equilibria, which could arise in the presence of two
positively-sloped behavioural relations on the two sides of the labour market.
However, the supply side of the labour market obviously contributes in de…ning
quantitatively and qualitatively the macroeconomic e¤ects of a change in the
degree of monopoly power. In this section, we brie‡y take up this point by
verifying the robustness of Propositions 1 and 2 to the introduction of both an
upward sloping competitive labour supply, and a wage setting schedule which
possibly describes non-competitive features of the labour market.
a) Competitive labour supply
The most straightforward way to reformulate the supply side of the labour
market is to think of a constant elasticity upward sloping competitive supply
function such as11
L =
³!
µ
´ 1
¾ ¡ 1 ; ¾ > 1
By applying the same procedure developed in section 3, the following em-
ployment multiplier can be obtained
´eL eG=dfL¤
d eG eGfL¤= ¡ ´r eG(®¡ 1)¡ ®´r eG ¡ (¾ ¡ 1) (21)
Simple inspection of equation (21) shows that Proposition 1 still holds.12 As
far as Proposition 2 is concerned, the new formulation of the multiplier shows
that a downward shift of a positively sloped PS schedule is no more a su¢cient
condition for an increase in public expenditure to be expansionary. However, the
additional condition
¡
(¾ ¡ 1) < (®¡ 1)¡ ®´r eG¢, which ensures that with ° < ½
the employment multiplier (21) is positive, is indeed theWalrasian local stability
condition. In other words, Proposition 2 holds, provided that the equilibrium
under consideration is locally stable.
b) Non competitive wage setting schedule
We describe the non competitive features of the labour market by coupling
the PS schedule with the following wage setting (WS) schedule
! = ­ (u; ²) ; ­u =
@­
@u
< 0 ­² =
@­
@²
< 0
where u is the unemployment rate and ² is again the product demand elas-
ticity. Through this general formulation we capture some common features of
unions and bargaining models, namely that wages are set as a mark-up over the
11This labour supply can be easily obtained by modifying the utility function (1) into
U
³
C; M
P
; L
´
= C¯
³
M
P
´1¡¯ ¡ µ
¾
L¾ .
12 Indeed, if ° > ½ a positive multiplier is now in principle consistent also with a positively
sloped price setting schedule, but this case can be ruled out by stability considerations.
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workers’ outside opportunities, that the latter are inversely correlated to the
rate of unemployment and, …nally, that the mark-up over outside opportunities
depends positively on the degree of market power on the product market. No-
tice that the reference to this non competitive framework opens the possibility
that a transmission mechanism of …scal policy, based on changes in product
demand elasticity, operates not only directly, via shifts in the PS schedule, but
also indirectly via induced shifts of the WS schedule.
In order to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy on employment we fol-
low the same procedure developed in section 3, and obtain the employment
multiplier:
´eL eG = ¡
´r eG ¡ eG! @­@ eG
(®¡ 1)¡ ®´r eG ¡ fL¤! @­@eL
To evaluate the sign of this multiplier, we again consider …rst the case in
which the elasticity of public demand is higher than that of private demand. If
° > ½, @­=@ eG = ­² ³@²=@ eG´ < 0 and @­=@eL = ­u ³@u=@eL´+­² ³@²=@eL´ >
0. This allows us to establish that if the conditions for the PS schedule to be
negatively sloped are veri…ed, then an expansionary …scal policy has a positive
e¤ect on employment. The PS curve shifts upwards and the overall e¤ect is
ampli…ed by a downward shift of a positively sloped WS schedule.
If ° < ½, @­=@ eG > 0 while @­=@eL is ambiguous in sign. If it is positive, so
that the WS is positively sloped, and if the PS is upward sloping as well, then
the above multiplier is positive, provided the WS intersects the PS from above
(it is ‡atter at equilibrium). This con…guration resambles that obtained above
in a competitive framework. In this case, however, we cannot easily rely upon
stability conditions. As noticed by Manning (1990), if both the labour and the
goods markets are non competitive, no equilibria can be assessed to be stable
or unstable, without a priori information on the degree of the nominal and real
price and wage rigidities. Finally, we notice that if the WS schedule turns out
to be negatively sloped, the multiplier is unambiguously positive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the properties of a macroeconomic model
with monopolistic competition, where the di¤erentiated goods which enter the
aggregate output basket are demanded and consumed by both the private and
the public sector, with di¤erent demand elasticities. In this set-up, the level
of public expenditure in‡uences the overall demand elasticity and the labour
demand schedule, through a direct ’demand composition’ e¤ect. In particular,
we have proved that an increase in public expenditure may increase output,
not only (as previously established) when public demand is more elastic than
private demand and returns are decreasing, or when it is less elastic and returns
are increasing. There is a set of technological conditions, from moderately in-
creasing to moderately decreasing returns, in which …scal policy is expansionary,
independently of the way in which it alters the elasticity of demand at the initial
equilibrium.
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